25 July 2024

I participated on a panel on thirty years of South Africa’s democratic foreign policy, alongside Department of Trade, Industry, and Competition Deputy Director-General Lerato Mataboge and Department of International Relations and Cooperation Director-General Zane Dangor.

Some of the points I raised were that:

• South Africa’s foreign policy is undermined by a weak military and socio-economic challenges at home. Nor does the country have any clear international existential threats, most of them emanate from within. This leads to a watered down version of foreign policy than traditionally understood.
• South Africa’s foreign policy “red lines” are not established as a result.
• Additionally, South Africa’s position on Palestine and Ukraine are inconsistent with one another. This undermines South Africa’s voice, which is crucial for a non-military and non-economic power. Instead South Africa has sought to “cosplay realism” on behalf of other states such as Russia, who are not South Africa’s allies, putting the country in an awkward position.
• There has been too much decentralisation over the decades when it comes to the making of foreign policy, evident in the fact that the minister of international relations and cooperation is expected only to “coordinate” and not lead foreign policy.
• The presence of a South African judge in the International Court of Justice (IJC) does not present a foreign policy lever, nor should it. All ICJ judges, and all officials of the UN System, should be neutral. The extent of Judge Tladi’s flying of the “South African flag” should begin and end with his jurisprudence, which may or may not have uniquely South African or African underpinnings and manifestations.

Photographs courtesy of The Visual Studio.