A look at South Africa’s exports of books and newspapers makes for an optimistic read and shows some market resilience (at least at the macro level) even in this digital era.
But what are books and newspapers?
Under its Harmonized System (HS), the World Trade Organization (WTO) classifies all products under any one of 99 chapters, broadly based on their level of manufacturing input and complexity. Thus, for example, live animals are coded under Chapter 1, while vehicles and auto parts are under Chapter 87. Books and newspapers are coded under Chapter 49 in the HS. They include products such as printed books, newspapers, pictures and other products of the printing industry, manuscripts, and typescripts. Within Chapter 49, Heading 4901 is for printed books and Heading 4902 for newspapers, journals, and periodicals.
What the data shows
The data from SARS and the United Nations Trademap shows that South Africa exports more books and related products than it imports. The latest available data points to a balance of trade of R617.05-million in 2024 for books (from R374.36-million a decade earlier), and R133.02-million for newspapers in that same year (compared to R98.92-million ten years prior).
Table 1. South African newspaper exports, in millions of ZAR.
Years
Total exports
Exports to Africa
Imports
Balance of trade
2014
93.04
91.21
0.25
90.96
2015
142.84
140.94
1.11
139.82
2016
120.01
117.62
1.61
116.01
2017
124.17
107.50
1.67
105.83
2018
157.83
142.72
0.27
142.44
2019
123.50
121.52
0.12
121.39
2020
72.43
71.40
0.14
71.25
2021
84.95
84.65
0.13
84.52
2022
121.52
120.50
0.08
120.42
2023
124.94
122.77
0.33
122.44
2024
135.88
133.09
0.07
133.02
Source: Author, data from United Nations Trademap.
Table 2. South African book trade (including brochures), in millions of ZAR.
Years
Total exports
Exports to Africa
Imports
Balance of trade
2014
625.94
575.62
201.26
374.36
2015
719.28
657.45
187.77
469.68
2016
774.79
693.72
193.92
499.80
2017
619.70
558.00
158.51
399.49
2018
796.41
751.55
175.54
576.00
2019
728.71
674.34
114.899
559.44
2020
1092.31
1038.83
75.24
963.58
2021
482.33
440.33
110.39
329.93
2022
657.69
536.78
99.90
436.88
2023
759.45
696.93
98.79
598.13
2024
798.84
711.74
94.6
617.05
Source: Author, data from United Nations Trademap.
Room for growth
Books and newspapers constitute only 0.14% of South Africa’s exports to Africa, and 0.011% of GDP. South Africa exports its books and newspapers mostly to Africa, more than to any other region. In 2024, Africa represented 89.09% of South Africa’s book export market and 97.94% for newspapers. The country’s potential, including market diversification outside the continent and the SADC region, still has considerable room for growth.
The Sixth Global Internationalisation Survey conducted by the International Association of Universities (IAU), finds that an increase in “global, international and intercultural knowledge, skills and competences for both students and staff” ranks #2 among the list of institutional benefits of internationalisation for universities around the globe. This is the concept of global citizenship education (GCE). However the idea is open-ended and abstract — and so is subject to debate.
In a new article titled ‘Global citizenship education and the internationalisation of higher education: Critical perspectives from South Africa,’ published by the International Review of Education, Samia Chasi (Rhodes University) and Savo Heleta (Nelson Mandela University) adopt a critical and decolonial approach to GCE. In particular, they take issue with the emergence of this concept in a global structure still defined by global North and Eurocentric dominance in the production of knowledge. In order to put forward a new definition of higher education internationalisation, they draw first from critical diversity learning (CDL), a framework developed in South Africa. They utilise Melissa Steyn’s (2015) ten criteria for CDL:
1. Understanding the role of power in constructing differences that make a difference
2. Recognising the unequal symbolic and material value of different social locations;
3. Having the analytic skill to unpack how systems of oppression intersect, coconstruct and constitute each other, and how they can be reproduced, resisted and reframed;
4. Defining oppressive systems such as racism as current social problems and not only a historical legacy;
5. Understanding that social identities are learned and are an outcome of social practices;
6. Possessing the vocabulary to facilitate discussions of privilege and oppression;
7. Being able to interpret coded hegemonic practices;
8. Analysing the ways in which diversity hierarchies and institutionalised oppressions are inflected through specific social contexts and material arrangements;
9. Understanding the role of emotions, including our own, in all of the above;
10. Working to transform oppressive systems and deepen social justice at all levels of society.
They conclude that the above criteria “can help students critically read, confront and engage with a complex and ever-changing world.”
Overall the article is quite comprehensive and builds on scholarship. A more concise definition of internationalisation -which is what the abstract promises – is hard to come by in the text. But reading between the lines we can conclude that their definition of internationalisation is normative global engagement. By this I mean that their work highlights the important and unique role of South Africa as a historic site and contemporary actor, which compels it to be an advocate of critical global engagement. That is, the point is not merely to engage with the world, but to change it ever so slightly for the better. My own experience – and more importantly the White Paper on Higher Education Internationalisation – cohere with this, given the emphasis on equitable partnerships.
The Persistence of Memory by Salvador Dali (1931). Museum of Modern Art, New York City.
Lately I have been confronted with the thought that International Relations (IR) theory is essentially interpretive history, the thematic telling of history, based on the writer’s analysis of the most important trends of their subject. By aspiring to produce generalizable accounts of state behavior, IR scholars participate in the same effort. This is why political science – of which IR is a specialization – may be considered the final draft of history. But in their focus on the major themes, scholars (particularly those working within the Realist paradigm) have tended to focus on the most impactful actors – these tending to be the most powerful states. In so doing, they neglect the smaller states, which constitute the majority of the world.
But does resolving that problem pose a new one?
In a brilliant new article in the European Journal of International Relations (6 November 2025), Arjun Chowdhury (University of British Columbia, Canada) and Miles M. Evers (University of Connecticut, US) titled ‘Anachronism and International Relations theory‘ confront the problem of history and time in a unique problem of modern IR theory; the well-intentioned tendency to superimpose contemporary outlooks and concepts in bygone eras in an attempt to broaden geographical and historical representation (truly global history, and not just those of North America and Western Europe).
Making use of historical methods, archival sciences, and the philosophy of history, they argue that “two retrospective processes—information-destroying, which shapes what is preserved, and information-obscuring, which governs how that information is organized—flatten ideational variation in the historical record and distort the evidentiary foundations on which scholars depend for testing and building theories of world politics.” They term this structural anachronism.
Some examples they cite include studies of war such as Miller and Bakar’s (2023) conflict-event dataset, Kang’s (2010) account of the Confucian long peace, and Phillips’ (2021) analysis of imperial diversity regimes, which, they assert, “draw on selective sources that elevate some conflicts over others and use ideal types that impose coherence on episodes.” They also critique accounts of order such as Butcher and Griffiths (2017) on precolonial systems, Spruyt (2020) on regional worldviews, and Zarakol (2022) on Chinggisid sovereignty, whom they find to “rely on retrospective sources that reframe political diversity through modern traditions and categories like sovereignty.”
Is the problem of structural anarchism better than the alternative? I think it is. Given that the other problem is essentially erasure, the potentially inaccurate representation of non-Western pasts in modern IR theory can be surmountable by incremental correction. Indeed it can only come into the fore of IR theory in that way, much as ever-new theories have emerged by being correctives to prior efforts. The authors themselves argue as much, acknowledging that all of historical writing is bound to participate in some level of structural anachronism.
My latest book, Super President: The History and Future of Executive Power in South Africa, has been published by the University of Johannesburg Press (UJ Press).
Read more about the book below and get yourself the open access ebook or paperback copy.
Botswana has introduced a new ban on imports of citrus products from South Africa. As reported by Business Day, the move is intended to boost domestic production in the 2-million population nation, which has been battling new competition from lab-grown diamonds against its second-most prosperous export. In an election year, the pressures on the government are intense to provide a growing economy, or at least to introduce policies to make it seem so.
Botswana has imposed yet another ban on agricultural imports from SA, this time on oranges. Effective from June 17 to the end of August, the temporary ban has been enforced by Botswana’s agriculture ministry to support local farmers and stabilise the market. The move is part of a broader strategy aimed at achieving self-sufficiency in food production, a goal that has seen Botswana extend and expand restrictions on various fresh produce imports until the end of 2025. Their ministry urged businesses to source oranges locally from the Tuli Block, emphasising the importance of sustaining Botswana’s agricultural sector. Authorities have been tasked with closely monitoring the production situation to ensure the initiative’s success.
A look at the two-way trade between the two countries demonstrates that South Africa is indeed a dominant exporter to Botswana. Since 2019, exports have nearly doubled from R33-million to now R51.922-million according to the latest annual data (2023).
The picture becomes clearer when we consider that South Africa is the principal exporter to Botswana. The data below depicts the advantage enjoyed by South Africa, which accounts for more than 90% of all citrus products imported by Botswana. This makes South Africa an obvious target for Gaborone’s government.
Not only have exports to Botswana been growing in monetary terms, but in actual quantities too.
Yet Botswana is also a dominant trading partner when compared to South Africa in terms of livestock trade, enjoying about a billion rand gap in any given year since 2021. This should come as no surpise, as livestock have emerged as the country’s leading export, with about three catttle for every one human being in the country.
Nevertheless, the pressures on the Botswana economy are difficult and threaten the very stability of one of the continent’s stablest and most prosperous nation. South Africa can afford to take a knock on its citrus exports, for now, and ought to boost its subsidies for its farmers while engaging Botswana on how to support their transition from a diamond-centred economy. In the long-term, a European Union style common agricultural policy (CAP) programme, within the context of SACU, would be a safety-net for producers at a microeconomic level while also ensuring common prosperity at a macroeconomic scale.
I participated on a panel on thirty years of South Africa’s democratic foreign policy, alongside Department of Trade, Industry, and Competition Deputy Director-General Lerato Mataboge and Department of International Relations and Cooperation Director-General Zane Dangor.
Some of the points I raised were that:
South Africa’s foreign policy is undermined by a weak military and socio-economic challenges at home. Nor does the country have any clear international existential threats, most of them emanate from within. This leads to a watered down version of foreign policy than traditionally understood.
South Africa’s foreign policy “red lines” are not established as a result.
Additionally, South Africa’s position on Palestine and Ukraine are inconsistent with one another. This undermines South Africa’s voice, which is crucial for a non-military and non-economic power. Instead South Africa has sought to “cosplay realism” on behalf of other states such as Russia, who are not South Africa’s allies, putting the country in an awkward position.
There has been too much decentralisation over the decades when it comes to the making of foreign policy, evident in the fact that the minister of international relations and cooperation is expected only to “coordinate” and not lead foreign policy.
The presence of a South African judge in the International Court of Justice (IJC) does not present a foreign policy lever, nor should it. All ICJ judges, and all officials of the UN System, should be neutral. The extent of Judge Tladi’s flying of the “South African flag” should begin and end with his jurisprudence, which may or may not have uniquely South African or African underpinnings and manifestations.
The first TikTok page belongs to a gentleman named Godesulloh J. Bawa (@vibesestvida). I came across his page about two years ago and I discovered that he has some fascinating takes on African philosophy, Ubuntu, and politics in general. I watch his videos as often as they pop up on my FYP (For You Page) and I look into his videos when I would like to know more about African philosophers and their theories. He is not my typical news source as I prefer listening to the 702 radio station in the morning and reading current affairs from websites like AlJazeera.
His channel is more for leisure because I believe he has valuable insights into the dynamics and political realities of the African continent.
Credibility questions and strategies
In terms of his credibility, I would like to think that his views are valid because he mentioned that he has an African Studies Degree and he shows the books that he read which makes the audience see how his ideas are formed. By doing this, we do not only rely on him but on other credible political African scholars.
I would not use videos as references for my essays per se but I do think he somewhat shapes my thoughts and opinions on some African political theories and realities. What he talks about is relevant to my course, especially since this term we are doing African Political Thought which covers colonisation/neocolonialism, pan-Africanism, and the black consciousness movement so I would say his content is helpful to a certain extent. Some of my favourite videos of his are labelled “Development,” “How Colonialism preempted modernity in Africa,” and “Afrocracy II.”
The second TikTok I came across more recently by a woman named Amani Dube (@amanidube1). Her content covers geopolitics, macroeconomics, as well as South African current affairs. Since I only discovered her page a couple of months ago I have not fully explored her content but for now I can say that I enjoy the way she presents current affairs. She, like Godesulloh, is not a news source but I watch her TikToks as often as she pops up on my page. She presents the news by green-screening articles from credible resources like Business Day and AlJazeera while summarizing them to make it easier for viewers to understand. Since I am relatively new to her page, I have not yet decided on how credible her content is but from what I’ve seen so far, her content seems quite legitimate as I sometimes refer back to the articles she green-screens. Her content helps provide current affairs while I randomly scroll through my FYP which is especially important for my politics and economics modules. So far, I enjoy that she entertainingly provides current affairs, especially in her most recent video under the “South African Affairs” playlist.
Mihle Kambula is in her second year of study towards a BA in Politics and International Relations at the University of Johannesburg.
In today’s fast-paced world, there are three TikTok channels that I watch for political news. The first one is from Zethu (@zethugqola) and the second one from Dan (@dancorder), both of whom I watch very often. Then a third from Kaitlin (@bykaitlinrawson) whom I don’t watch as often as the others, but when I do come across her videos, I appreciate them because she always inputs her sources and the specific legal documents relating to the situation. She also breaks down the complex academic language into simpler English which many viewers will appreciate.
I cannot give an exact date of when I first encountered these channels, but I have been consuming their content for about 3 years on and off. I have been more frequent in the past 2 years. As South African elections are coming up, more information is spread across the internet and so creators like this pop up on your for you page more often.
I used to listen to the news much more in high school because I would listen to the radio every day during my drive to school. Whereas now, in university, I have a constantly changing schedule so I’m not guaranteed to catch the news on my morning drive. I am on TikTok every single day for hours on end and I am therefore bound to receive my news from the app. Thanks to the algorithm, I don’t necessarily get news videos all the time, but they appear when it is relevant to the current political climate in the country.
The possibility of the channels feeding fake news and strategies for verification
While fake news is a reality to be lived with, when it comes to these creators specifically, I am not worried about them feeding me fake news. They deliver the news in a detailed and concise manner, making it easy for your average citizen to understand, which I think is a very important quality.
Importantly, they also make use of sources and input news articles and photos that concern the topic they are discussing, which you can easily search up and fact check. I appreciate that because it shows that they are sourcing their knowledge from sites they deem credible and not just delivering news without any concrete evidence. I also make sure I follow up and do my own research on the topic after watching their videos.
Still, while I’m not so much worried about them feeding me fake news, I am cautious of bias that may come with the delivery of the news. It is natural for human beings to be biased. Even when I listen to the radio or news reports, depending on the topic, the presenter may show some bias. I make sure to acknowledge the facts and look at the evidence they provide, but also detect the moments when it is just a personal opinion.
Linking TikTok channels and my political science curriculum
I study Politics and Development Studies, two courses which often deal with real-time political issues, especially in the South African/African context. These channels provide insight on domestic and international news and I am able to apply this knowledge to class discussions on real-time issues such as the upcoming South African elections, service delivery, international wars (Russia and Ukraine, Palestine and Israel) and many more. They don’t only focus on real time politics, they can also make videos on history to help people conceptualise the state of the country now and how history affects that. Dan Corder, specifically, made a video discussing the history of Apartheid and its economic impact on black people in South Africa today, which is a very relevant topic that I often discuss in my different lectures in university.
Nnoye Olisa is currently in her second year of studying for a BA Humanities: Politics and International Relations and Development Studies at the University of Johannesburg. She can be found @Nnoye.o.
The Iranian flag is hung prior to a meeting between Secretary-General António Guterres and Hassan Rouhani, then President of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Source: UN Photo/Cia Pak, 18 September 2017.
The unthinkable has happened. Iran’s attack on Israel on the 14th of April, consisting of over 300 drones and missiles, marks an important moment in 21st century international relations. While it is not the beginning of World War III, it is a crucial moment in the Second Cold War. It is the first instance of a regional power taking step towards the risk of interstate war with another in decades. But while an unprecedented escalation, it is not the long-feared Armageddon of a third world war and at most is likely a highpoint in what future historians will write about when they turn to the new Cold War, which has been unfolding since the end of US unipolarity. In this new Cold War exists on one side the US and its NATO and non-NATO allies (what we may term the status quo side); on the other are revisionist countries that have grievances against the US and its regional allies. These include states such as China, Russia, and Iran. In-between is a vast number of countries, with lesser capabilities, whose positions opportunistically alternate depending on the views of their current governments (Argentina, as seen from its BRICS U-turn, being one such example) or what each side has to offer at any given time.
In many ways, the events of today are a proxy for world opinion, and the immediate responses to the Iranian attack tell us who is which side.
Some context
Although the two countries have been in a state of enmity since 1979, they had always avoided direct attacks on one another. Iran has always made use of proxy forces, while Israel has attacked Iranian assets regionally. As with most Middle Eastern implosions, tensions are complex and layered, but often point to sectoral differences and the Israel-Palestine conflict. The Iranian government has strong ties to Hamas, whose attack on Israel on 7 October 2023 has led to the ongoing Israeli actions in the Gaza strip in which tens of thousands have died, leading to the ICJ determining that there is a credible claim of genocide taking place there. The latest escalation, however, comes as a result of 1 April Israeli attack on Iran’s consular office in Damascus, Syria, which resulted in seven casualties.
Status quo side
US President Joe Biden, who has not condemned the 1 April attack by Israel, has made the following statement after Iran’s attack:
“”I just met with my national security team for an update on Iran’s attacks against Israel. Our commitment to Israel’s security against threats from Iran and its proxies is ironclad.””
Other pro-status quo (i.e., pro-NATO, pro-US and pro-Israel) world leaders, including the UK, Germany, France, Argentina, and the Scandinavian countries, have made similar condemnations of Iran’s actions clear. Only one so far, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, has made the link between the current Israel-Gaza War. When doing so, he uses the history to lay further blame on Iran.
“Canada unequivocally condemns Iran’s airborne attacks against Israel. We stand with Israel. After supporting Hamas’ brutal Oct. 7 attack, the Iranian regime’s latest actions will further destabilize the region and make lasting peace more difficult. These attacks demonstrate yet again the Iranian regime’s disregard for peace and stability in the region. We support Israel’s right to defend itself and its people from these attacks.”
Revisionist side
On the other hand, countries outside the US/NATO orbit have expressed concern about the attack, but are careful to characterise it as part of the wider regional situation. They also link it to international law, thereby indirectly condemning Israel itself for the attack on Iran’s diplomatic office in Syria on April 1st. Those countries include China, Mexico, Colombia, and Chile. Colombia’s President Gustavo Petro has been the most forthright:
“It was predictable; we’re now in the prelude to World War III precisely when humanity should rebuild its economy towards the rapid goal of decarbonization. The support of the U.S., in practice, for a genocide, has ignited the world. Everyone knows how wars start, no one knows how they end. If only the people of Israel were high enough, like their ancestors, to stop the madness of their ruler. The United Nations must meet urgently and must immediately commit to peace.”
China, a leading state on the side of the ‘revisionist’ camp, has similarly expressed deep concerns, while in the aftermath of the Israeli attack on the consular office it had made the following statement:
“Foreign Minister Wang Yi said that China strongly condemns the attack on the Iranian Embassy in Syria. He stressed the inviolability of the security of diplomatic missions and that Iran and Syria’s sovereignty must be respected. This round of escalation is the latest spillover of the Gaza conflict. The pressing need now is to bring an end to the conflict as soon as possible. China calls on parties to the conflict to implement UN Security Council Resolution 2728, put in place an immediate ceasefire and halt the humanitarian crisis. China will continue to view the issue based on its merits, play a constructive role in resolving the Middle East issue and help deescalate the situation. The US in particular needs to play a constructive role.”
Even if later statements follow, the knee-jerk statements by some, and silence by others, are telling in themselves. If it was not clear before, it must be now: we are in a Second Cold War. The attack on Israel has also not yielded any casualties due to that country’s sophisticated Iron Dome defence system. This likely makes Israel eager to retaliate though with no sense of urgency. This, and the geography of the Middle East (see map below), mean that the unofficial war will continue in that mode.
Some unknowns
Map of the Middle East. Source: Flickr.
Why would Iran take the brazen step of risking interstate war by attacking directly on Israeli soil, something it has avoided doing for decades? There are a number of reasons, some more probable than others.
Israel’s attack on Iran’s diplomatic site in Syria has lost Israel the credibility of being a victim in world opinion. April 1, in addition to well-documented war crimes in Gaza, changed its tempo from defence to offence.
Iran has a position of relative security; Israel would need to fly its air force over two countries to make further attacks on Iran, namely Jordan and Iraq. Neither of these countries is an ally of Israel, and both have already closed their airspace, thereby limiting the former’s ability to retaliate immediately.
Iran may have gotten direct or indirect assurances from key players in the revisionist camp for support should there be further retaliation.
Finally, and perhaps most far-fetched, Iran may be approaching nuclear status and therefore acting with unprecedented confidence. In recent months, reports have emerged that the country has reached such capabilities. A Guardianstory reports, for example, that “Iran is enriching uranium [at a] high level – very close to the 90% regarded as weapons grade.”
The last point is worth pulling at some more. In March this year, the director of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an agency of the UN tasked with ensuring nuclear energy is only used for civilian purposes, admitted that that the inspectorate had lost “continuity of knowledge about the production and stock of centrifuges, rotors, heavy water and uranium ore concentrate” in Iran. In other words, Iran may be approaching a state of nuclear ambiguity — as Israel has long done for some decades. What this would mean for the new Cold War is yet to be seen. Some literature indicates that the possession of nuclear capabilities makes states less likely to engage in direct conflict or, as in the case of India and Pakistan as well as China and India, when they do, the nuclear factor makes them have regular but low-level skirmishes.
Still, fears of the prospect of nuclear terrorism are real and would add another layer of volatility to an already unstable world.
Yesterday, the 28th of March, the Public Policy and Research Institute of Zimbabwe (PPRIZ) hosted a multistakeholder reference group engagement in South Africa. Following the delivery of a brilliant presentation on China’s strategic goals in South Africa by Dr Emmanuel Matambo (Research Director of the UJ Centre for Africa-China Studies), I had the honour of being the respondent. Matambo’s talk used a three-pronged approach to understanding China’s activities in South Africa: the political, media, and academia. In all three, I found his analysis precise and on point. I was still left optimistic, however; China may be making concerted efforts to influence all three spheres in the country, but South Africa (and South Africans) show an incredible amount of resilience and imperviousness.
A lively question and answer session followed, in which I got to answer a few questions myself. Inevitably, a question was fielded about “China taking over African infrastructure” when they cannot pay their debts – the so-called ‘debt trap.’ Having looked at the claim in some detail a few years ago, I replied that there is no such thing. It’s a classic case of fake news. I share my research into how this lie came about and has caught fire below.
The history of a lie
In December 2018 John Bolton, then US national security adviser and the point-person for Trump’s Africa strategy stated as fact that “China planned to take over some state-owned enterprises if the Zambian government defaulted on its debt” (NBC, 2021, February 17). This was widespread news, and has since remained in the mainstream discourse. One of its original mainstream outlets was an NBC report initially put out in September of 2018. The NBC article itself was relaying an interview with a “consultant” in which he expressed “intentions” that his firm “had seen” regarding China’s appetite for the southern African country’s assets. Importantly, the consultant was not referring to events which had occurred. To quote the NBC article: “Research from business risk consultancy EXX Africa suggested that Chinese firms are seeking control of Zambian mining assets as collateral for potential loan defaults” (NBC, 2018 [updated 2021]). Earlier in 2018 (September), the following headline by African Liberty was widely circulated.
Sample of a fake news headline online. Source: African Liberty, ‘China is taking over Zambia’s National Assets, but the Nightmare is just getting Started for Africa’ by Ibrahim Anoba September 10, 2018.
The article[1] cites its information as stemming from a credible source of information which claimed that a Zambian SOE had already been taken over. That article, however, published in Lusaka Times,[2] in turn only provides as its proof the following: “The respected Africa Confidential has revealed that talks are underway for a Chinese company to takeover power utility ZESCO” (emphasis added).
How misunderstanding becomes policy, and how policy fuels misunderstanding
This evinces a particular feature of fake news: exaggeration. This allows for purveyors to be able to link their stories to a degree of truth. An initial report will introduce a case with careful wording (showing, for example, that plans are at most being “discussed”). This in turn morphs into an appeal to authority and sees tenuous or tentative developments reported as fact.
In this instance, we must locate the root problem of how fake news can find its footing on Africa-China relations: the deliberate paucity of raw data and information from either the African or Chinese governments, or the FOCAC process itself, leaves an information gap which can only be closed by speculation and exaggeration. Both sides should take measures to be transparent and open.
