21 October 2024
My latest book, Super President: The History and Future of Executive Power in South Africa, has been published by the University of Johannesburg Press (UJ Press).
Read more about the book below and get yourself the open access ebook or paperback copy.
10 August 2024
Botswana has introduced a new ban on imports of citrus products from South Africa. As reported by Business Day, the move is intended to boost domestic production in the 2-million population nation, which has been battling new competition from lab-grown diamonds against its second-most prosperous export. In an election year, the pressures on the government are intense to provide a growing economy, or at least to introduce policies to make it seem so.
Botswana has imposed yet another ban on agricultural imports from SA, this time on oranges. Effective from June 17 to the end of August, the temporary ban has been enforced by Botswana’s agriculture ministry to support local farmers and stabilise the market. The move is part of a broader strategy aimed at achieving self-sufficiency in food production, a goal that has seen Botswana extend and expand restrictions on various fresh produce imports until the end of 2025. Their ministry urged businesses to source oranges locally from the Tuli Block, emphasising the importance of sustaining Botswana’s agricultural sector. Authorities have been tasked with closely monitoring the production situation to ensure the initiative’s success.
— Business Day, 6 August 2024
A look at the two-way trade between the two countries demonstrates that South Africa is indeed a dominant exporter to Botswana. Since 2019, exports have nearly doubled from R33-million to now R51.922-million according to the latest annual data (2023).
The picture becomes clearer when we consider that South Africa is the principal exporter to Botswana. The data below depicts the advantage enjoyed by South Africa, which accounts for more than 90% of all citrus products imported by Botswana. This makes South Africa an obvious target for Gaborone’s government.
Not only have exports to Botswana been growing in monetary terms, but in actual quantities too.
Yet Botswana is also a dominant trading partner when compared to South Africa in terms of livestock trade, enjoying about a billion rand gap in any given year since 2021. This should come as no surpise, as livestock have emerged as the country’s leading export, with about three catttle for every one human being in the country.
Nevertheless, the pressures on the Botswana economy are difficult and threaten the very stability of one of the continent’s stablest and most prosperous nation. South Africa can afford to take a knock on its citrus exports, for now, and ought to boost its subsidies for its farmers while engaging Botswana on how to support their transition from a diamond-centred economy. In the long-term, a European Union style common agricultural policy (CAP) programme, within the context of SACU, would be a safety-net for producers at a microeconomic level while also ensuring common prosperity at a macroeconomic scale.
25 July 2024
I participated on a panel on thirty years of South Africa’s democratic foreign policy, alongside Department of Trade, Industry, and Competition Deputy Director-General Lerato Mataboge and Department of International Relations and Cooperation Director-General Zane Dangor.
Some of the points I raised were that:
Photographs courtesy of The Visual Studio.
Mihle Kambula (Guest Blog)
21 April 2024
News outside the mainstream
The first TikTok page belongs to a gentleman named Godesulloh J. Bawa (@vibesestvida). I came across his page about two years ago and I discovered that he has some fascinating takes on African philosophy, Ubuntu, and politics in general. I watch his videos as often as they pop up on my FYP (For You Page) and I look into his videos when I would like to know more about African philosophers and their theories. He is not my typical news source as I prefer listening to the 702 radio station in the morning and reading current affairs from websites like AlJazeera.
His channel is more for leisure because I believe he has valuable insights into the dynamics and political realities of the African continent.
Credibility questions and strategies
In terms of his credibility, I would like to think that his views are valid because he mentioned that he has an African Studies Degree and he shows the books that he read which makes the audience see how his ideas are formed. By doing this, we do not only rely on him but on other credible political African scholars.
I would not use videos as references for my essays per se but I do think he somewhat shapes my thoughts and opinions on some African political theories and realities. What he talks about is relevant to my course, especially since this term we are doing African Political Thought which covers colonisation/neocolonialism, pan-Africanism, and the black consciousness movement so I would say his content is helpful to a certain extent. Some of my favourite videos of his are labelled “Development,” “How Colonialism preempted modernity in Africa,” and “Afrocracy II.”
The second TikTok I came across more recently by a woman named Amani Dube (@amanidube1). Her content covers geopolitics, macroeconomics, as well as South African current affairs. Since I only discovered her page a couple of months ago I have not fully explored her content but for now I can say that I enjoy the way she presents current affairs. She, like Godesulloh, is not a news source but I watch her TikToks as often as she pops up on my page. She presents the news by green-screening articles from credible resources like Business Day and AlJazeera while summarizing them to make it easier for viewers to understand. Since I am relatively new to her page, I have not yet decided on how credible her content is but from what I’ve seen so far, her content seems quite legitimate as I sometimes refer back to the articles she green-screens. Her content helps provide current affairs while I randomly scroll through my FYP which is especially important for my politics and economics modules. So far, I enjoy that she entertainingly provides current affairs, especially in her most recent video under the “South African Affairs” playlist.
Mihle Kambula is in her second year of study towards a BA in Politics and International Relations at the University of Johannesburg.
By Nnoye Olisa (Guest Blog)
21 April 2024
Credit: Plann/https://www.plannthat.com/how-do-tiktok-stories-work/
In today’s fast-paced world, there are three TikTok channels that I watch for political news. The first one is from Zethu (@zethugqola) and the second one from Dan (@dancorder), both of whom I watch very often. Then a third from Kaitlin (@bykaitlinrawson) whom I don’t watch as often as the others, but when I do come across her videos, I appreciate them because she always inputs her sources and the specific legal documents relating to the situation. She also breaks down the complex academic language into simpler English which many viewers will appreciate.
I cannot give an exact date of when I first encountered these channels, but I have been consuming their content for about 3 years on and off. I have been more frequent in the past 2 years. As South African elections are coming up, more information is spread across the internet and so creators like this pop up on your for you page more often.
I used to listen to the news much more in high school because I would listen to the radio every day during my drive to school. Whereas now, in university, I have a constantly changing schedule so I’m not guaranteed to catch the news on my morning drive. I am on TikTok every single day for hours on end and I am therefore bound to receive my news from the app. Thanks to the algorithm, I don’t necessarily get news videos all the time, but they appear when it is relevant to the current political climate in the country.
The possibility of the channels feeding fake news and strategies for verification
While fake news is a reality to be lived with, when it comes to these creators specifically, I am not worried about them feeding me fake news. They deliver the news in a detailed and concise manner, making it easy for your average citizen to understand, which I think is a very important quality.
Importantly, they also make use of sources and input news articles and photos that concern the topic they are discussing, which you can easily search up and fact check. I appreciate that because it shows that they are sourcing their knowledge from sites they deem credible and not just delivering news without any concrete evidence. I also make sure I follow up and do my own research on the topic after watching their videos.
Still, while I’m not so much worried about them feeding me fake news, I am cautious of bias that may come with the delivery of the news. It is natural for human beings to be biased. Even when I listen to the radio or news reports, depending on the topic, the presenter may show some bias. I make sure to acknowledge the facts and look at the evidence they provide, but also detect the moments when it is just a personal opinion.
Linking TikTok channels and my political science curriculum
I study Politics and Development Studies, two courses which often deal with real-time political issues, especially in the South African/African context. These channels provide insight on domestic and international news and I am able to apply this knowledge to class discussions on real-time issues such as the upcoming South African elections, service delivery, international wars (Russia and Ukraine, Palestine and Israel) and many more. They don’t only focus on real time politics, they can also make videos on history to help people conceptualise the state of the country now and how history affects that. Dan Corder, specifically, made a video discussing the history of Apartheid and its economic impact on black people in South Africa today, which is a very relevant topic that I often discuss in my different lectures in university.
Nnoye Olisa is currently in her second year of studying for a BA Humanities: Politics and International Relations and Development Studies at the University of Johannesburg. She can be found @Nnoye.o.
14 April 2024
The unthinkable has happened. Iran’s attack on Israel on the 14th of April, consisting of over 300 drones and missiles, marks an important moment in 21st century international relations. While it is not the beginning of World War III, it is a crucial moment in the Second Cold War. It is the first instance of a regional power taking step towards the risk of interstate war with another in decades. But while an unprecedented escalation, it is not the long-feared Armageddon of a third world war and at most is likely a highpoint in what future historians will write about when they turn to the new Cold War, which has been unfolding since the end of US unipolarity. In this new Cold War exists on one side the US and its NATO and non-NATO allies (what we may term the status quo side); on the other are revisionist countries that have grievances against the US and its regional allies. These include states such as China, Russia, and Iran. In-between is a vast number of countries, with lesser capabilities, whose positions opportunistically alternate depending on the views of their current governments (Argentina, as seen from its BRICS U-turn, being one such example) or what each side has to offer at any given time.
In many ways, the events of today are a proxy for world opinion, and the immediate responses to the Iranian attack tell us who is which side.
Some context
Although the two countries have been in a state of enmity since 1979, they had always avoided direct attacks on one another. Iran has always made use of proxy forces, while Israel has attacked Iranian assets regionally. As with most Middle Eastern implosions, tensions are complex and layered, but often point to sectoral differences and the Israel-Palestine conflict. The Iranian government has strong ties to Hamas, whose attack on Israel on 7 October 2023 has led to the ongoing Israeli actions in the Gaza strip in which tens of thousands have died, leading to the ICJ determining that there is a credible claim of genocide taking place there. The latest escalation, however, comes as a result of 1 April Israeli attack on Iran’s consular office in Damascus, Syria, which resulted in seven casualties.
Status quo side
US President Joe Biden, who has not condemned the 1 April attack by Israel, has made the following statement after Iran’s attack:
“”I just met with my national security team for an update on Iran’s attacks against Israel. Our commitment to Israel’s security against threats from Iran and its proxies is ironclad.””
Other pro-status quo (i.e., pro-NATO, pro-US and pro-Israel) world leaders, including the UK, Germany, France, Argentina, and the Scandinavian countries, have made similar condemnations of Iran’s actions clear. Only one so far, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, has made the link between the current Israel-Gaza War. When doing so, he uses the history to lay further blame on Iran.
“Canada unequivocally condemns Iran’s airborne attacks against Israel. We stand with Israel. After supporting Hamas’ brutal Oct. 7 attack, the Iranian regime’s latest actions will further destabilize the region and make lasting peace more difficult. These attacks demonstrate yet again the Iranian regime’s disregard for peace and stability in the region. We support Israel’s right to defend itself and its people from these attacks.”
Revisionist side
On the other hand, countries outside the US/NATO orbit have expressed concern about the attack, but are careful to characterise it as part of the wider regional situation. They also link it to international law, thereby indirectly condemning Israel itself for the attack on Iran’s diplomatic office in Syria on April 1st. Those countries include China, Mexico, Colombia, and Chile. Colombia’s President Gustavo Petro has been the most forthright:
“It was predictable; we’re now in the prelude to World War III precisely when humanity should rebuild its economy towards the rapid goal of decarbonization. The support of the U.S., in practice, for a genocide, has ignited the world. Everyone knows how wars start, no one knows how they end. If only the people of Israel were high enough, like their ancestors, to stop the madness of their ruler. The United Nations must meet urgently and must immediately commit to peace.”
China, a leading state on the side of the ‘revisionist’ camp, has similarly expressed deep concerns, while in the aftermath of the Israeli attack on the consular office it had made the following statement:
“Foreign Minister Wang Yi said that China strongly condemns the attack on the Iranian Embassy in Syria. He stressed the inviolability of the security of diplomatic missions and that Iran and Syria’s sovereignty must be respected. This round of escalation is the latest spillover of the Gaza conflict. The pressing need now is to bring an end to the conflict as soon as possible. China calls on parties to the conflict to implement UN Security Council Resolution 2728, put in place an immediate ceasefire and halt the humanitarian crisis. China will continue to view the issue based on its merits, play a constructive role in resolving the Middle East issue and help deescalate the situation. The US in particular needs to play a constructive role.”
Even if later statements follow, the knee-jerk statements by some, and silence by others, are telling in themselves. If it was not clear before, it must be now: we are in a Second Cold War. The attack on Israel has also not yielded any casualties due to that country’s sophisticated Iron Dome defence system. This likely makes Israel eager to retaliate though with no sense of urgency. This, and the geography of the Middle East (see map below), mean that the unofficial war will continue in that mode.
Some unknowns
Why would Iran take the brazen step of risking interstate war by attacking directly on Israeli soil, something it has avoided doing for decades? There are a number of reasons, some more probable than others.
The last point is worth pulling at some more. In March this year, the director of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an agency of the UN tasked with ensuring nuclear energy is only used for civilian purposes, admitted that that the inspectorate had lost “continuity of knowledge about the production and stock of centrifuges, rotors, heavy water and uranium ore concentrate” in Iran. In other words, Iran may be approaching a state of nuclear ambiguity — as Israel has long done for some decades. What this would mean for the new Cold War is yet to be seen. Some literature indicates that the possession of nuclear capabilities makes states less likely to engage in direct conflict or, as in the case of India and Pakistan as well as China and India, when they do, the nuclear factor makes them have regular but low-level skirmishes.
Still, fears of the prospect of nuclear terrorism are real and would add another layer of volatility to an already unstable world.
29 March 2024
Yesterday, the 28th of March, the Public Policy and Research Institute of Zimbabwe (PPRIZ) hosted a multistakeholder reference group engagement in South Africa. Following the delivery of a brilliant presentation on China’s strategic goals in South Africa by Dr Emmanuel Matambo (Research Director of the UJ Centre for Africa-China Studies), I had the honour of being the respondent. Matambo’s talk used a three-pronged approach to understanding China’s activities in South Africa: the political, media, and academia. In all three, I found his analysis precise and on point. I was still left optimistic, however; China may be making concerted efforts to influence all three spheres in the country, but South Africa (and South Africans) show an incredible amount of resilience and imperviousness.
A lively question and answer session followed, in which I got to answer a few questions myself. Inevitably, a question was fielded about “China taking over African infrastructure” when they cannot pay their debts – the so-called ‘debt trap.’ Having looked at the claim in some detail a few years ago, I replied that there is no such thing. It’s a classic case of fake news. I share my research into how this lie came about and has caught fire below.
The history of a lie
In December 2018 John Bolton, then US national security adviser and the point-person for Trump’s Africa strategy stated as fact that “China planned to take over some state-owned enterprises if the Zambian government defaulted on its debt” (NBC, 2021, February 17). This was widespread news, and has since remained in the mainstream discourse. One of its original mainstream outlets was an NBC report initially put out in September of 2018. The NBC article itself was relaying an interview with a “consultant” in which he expressed “intentions” that his firm “had seen” regarding China’s appetite for the southern African country’s assets. Importantly, the consultant was not referring to events which had occurred. To quote the NBC article: “Research from business risk consultancy EXX Africa suggested that Chinese firms are seeking control of Zambian mining assets as collateral for potential loan defaults” (NBC, 2018 [updated 2021]). Earlier in 2018 (September), the following headline by African Liberty was widely circulated.
Sample of a fake news headline online. Source: African Liberty, ‘China is taking over Zambia’s National Assets, but the Nightmare is just getting Started for Africa’ by Ibrahim Anoba September 10, 2018.
The article[1] cites its information as stemming from a credible source of information which claimed that a Zambian SOE had already been taken over. That article, however, published in Lusaka Times,[2] in turn only provides as its proof the following: “The respected Africa Confidential has revealed that talks are underway for a Chinese company to takeover power utility ZESCO” (emphasis added).
How misunderstanding becomes policy, and how policy fuels misunderstanding
This evinces a particular feature of fake news: exaggeration. This allows for purveyors to be able to link their stories to a degree of truth. An initial report will introduce a case with careful wording (showing, for example, that plans are at most being “discussed”). This in turn morphs into an appeal to authority and sees tenuous or tentative developments reported as fact.
In this instance, we must locate the root problem of how fake news can find its footing on Africa-China relations: the deliberate paucity of raw data and information from either the African or Chinese governments, or the FOCAC process itself, leaves an information gap which can only be closed by speculation and exaggeration. Both sides should take measures to be transparent and open.
[1] Anoba, Ibrahim. 2018 (September 10). ‘China is taking over Zambia’s National Assets, but the Nightmare is just getting Started for Africa’ African Liberty. URL: https://www.africanliberty.org/2018/09/10/china-is-taking-over-zambia-national-assets-but-the-nightmare-is-just-starting-for-africa/.
[2] Lusaka Times. 2018 (September 4). ‘China to take over ZESCO – Africa Confidential,’ Lusaka Times. URL: https://www.lusakatimes.com/2018/09/04/china-to-take-over-zesco-africa-confidential/.
28 March 2024
In Africa’s ‘year of elections’ – in which more than a third of the continent is scheduled to head to the polls – the Republic of Senegal has delivered the first widely positive and celebrated results. On the 25th of March, the country elected its youngest president to date. Bassirou Diomaye Faye, born in 1980, obtained 54% of the vote on his 44th birthday. With no run-off election required, he will be sworn in to the presidency on the 2nd of April. The incumbent, President Macky Sall, has congratulated Faye and the Senegalese people and pledged his cooperation in the transfer of power.
Senegal’s president-elect Bassirou Faye. Wikemedia Commons.
Faye’s journey is one for the history books. In addition to his youth, his victory is all the more impressive when we consider that this is his first electoral contest and, moreover, that he was running as an independent. His party — African Patriots of Senegal for Work, Ethics and Fraternity (PASTEF) — was barred from participating in the 2024 election and he therefore ran as an independent.
South Africa is holding its own general elections on the 29th of May and will be having independents on the ballot for the first time. Following the Independent Electoral Commission’s released lists on the 27th of March, we know that there are 16 candidates without a political party affiliation.
In light of this, could the country see an independent candidate emerge as president as well? The short answer is no, but the reason(s) why are still interesting and worth briefly reviewing.
The main reason is the difference in the two country’s electoral systems. While Senegal has a presidential electoral system, South Africa has a parliamentary system. This means that while Faye ran for president, the South African candidates will be running to be elected into parliament, which will in turn elect a president. In section 86, the country’s 1996 constitution provides the following process for the election of a president:
(1) At its first sitting after its election, and whenever necessary to fill a vacancy, the
National Assembly must elect a woman or a man from among its members to be the
President.
(2) The Chief Justice must preside over the election of the President, or designate
another judge to do so. The procedure set out in Part A of Schedule 3 applies to the
election of the President.
(3) An election to fill a vacancy in the office of President must be held at a time and on
a date determined by the Chief Justice, but not more than 30 days after the vacancy
occurs.
Given South Africa’s party-based political system, the following would have to ensue for an independent to be elected as president:
The independent candidate would then have the difficult task of forming a cabinet. Given that they would have no long list of parliamentarians readily available to them, it would be extremely challenging for them to do what the Constitution requires in section 91(1) in that they (as President):
(a) must select the Deputy President from among the members of the National Assembly;
(b) may select any number of Ministers from among the members of the Assembly; and
(c) may select no more than two Ministers from outside the Assembly.
Clearly the odds are heavily against an independent emerging as president. Were they to do so, they would also live under constant threat of a no-confidence vote due to having no reliable MPs of their own.
But an independent minister?
In the event that there is a coalition situation, we can nonetheless expect the possibility of at least one independent parliamentarian being appointed as a minister in order to provide votes for the ruling party or ruling coalition.
26 March 2024
“You can always count on Americans to do the right thing – after they’ve tried everything else.”
So said Winston Churchill, referring to the US’s penchant to drag its feet on major international issues. Then he was referring to Washington’s late entry into the Second World War, but the same words may best sum up its slowly (very slowly) shifting stance on the Gaza situation when, finally, on the 25th of March, America did not veto yet another UN Security Council resolution calling for a ceasefire. While many have criticised the US representative to the UN for only ‘abstaining,’ it should be sufficiently clear: an American abstention is essentially a ‘yes’ vote. The resolution would not have passed had America, or any of the other four permanent members, voted ‘no.’ That is how it has been for the past several months.
But why have things gone differently now?
Politics of course.
On Friday 22 March Politico ran a long piece on the changing relationship between US President Joe Biden and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. In the article, written by seasoned journalist Michael Hirsh and running under the title ‘From ‘I Love You’ to ‘Asshole’: How Joe Gave Up on Bibi,’ we delve into a schism between two men who have been friends for some four decades, who have often disagreed. Now, however, their worldviews, and more importantly their political incentives, are are odds one another; Biden wants to win re-election in November, and Netanyahu wants to prolong the campaign in order to avoid being forced to step down once ‘normalcy’ is resumed in Israeli (and Israeli politics). And in such a situation, Biden has chosen to finally align himself with world, and increasingly Democratic Party, opinion.
Every Democratic US president since Bill Clinton in the 1990s has had to contend with the difficult personality of Netanyahu. Sometimes the tiffs have seeped from proper diplomatic channels and into the public domain: consider the Israeli PM’s address to the US Congress against the wishes of President Obama, or the hot mic moment when the latter was caught speaking candidly to his French counterpart about Netanyahu’s dishonesty.
Netanyahu as a liability
Israel’s brutally heavy-handed campaign in Gaza has caught the collective attention of the world. For America and Biden, it takes place in an election year. The last thing the incumbent needs is a crisis in the Middle East under his watch. South Africa’s successful case in the International Court of Justice, by credibly giving the label of genocide to Israeli actions in Gaza, has made it difficult to carry on with business as usual.
Yet Israel (and its right to ‘defend’ itself) is still a vote-winning issue in the US and no president is likely to even contemplate abandoning the alliance. While in ordinary times no American president would dare turn their metaphorical back, even on symbolic issues such as UN votes, it is also clear that in this instance Netanyahu has become a liability. He is unpopular at home, for reasons to do with the war, corruption charges, the emergence of some evidence that he has helped prop up Hamas in order to personally remain relevant, his settlement policy (which reportedly took attention from Gaza and allowed Hamas to breach the barricade-like border between the two territories) and he is barely hanging on to a far-right coalition, having only cobbled together 23% of the vote in the 2022 elections. As a sign of how lowly Netanyahu now ranks in Biden’s opinion, in early March the US administration hosted the former’s main rival, the former defence minister and member of war cabinet (without portfolio) Benny Gantz, when he meet with Vice President Kamala Harris.
Allowing the UNSC resolution to go ahead is a slap on the wrist in the hopes that Netanyahu’s government will turn around and be more pliable.
Will this result in a permanent break in US-Israeli relations? Not at all. Israel is already becoming isolated on the international stage. Nor does America wish for a severing of its close ties to Israel — only its current leader. The US abstention is an important but inconsequential development for the Washington-Tel Aviv relationship. It is a symptom of how far right, and far removed, Netanyahu and his Likud party and allies are from everyone else. Both Biden and Netanyahu may well be waiting for the other to be removed so that they may work with a more agreeable side. The first key date to watch for is November: when either Biden or former president Donald Trump will emerge victorious. Trump, who famously recognised Jerusalem as the Israeli capital, is unlikely to press on Netanyahu as Biden seems to be starting to do, while another Israeli PM would seek to distance themselves from the genocide-accused person and legacy of Netanyahu.
27 March 2024
Co-written with constitutional scholar Dan Mafora. Forthcoming in the Daily Maverick.
In his March 25th piece for the Daily Maverick, Stephen Grootes makes the case for reducing the powers of the South African president, particularly the president’s powers of appointment. He points to comments made recently by Trevor Manuel at The Gathering, who similarly takes issue with the president’s authority to make appointments to key public offices. The former minister even makes the suggestion that the president’s current powers may have been an oversight and ought to be revisited. He asks whether such powers are “consonant with the spirit of our Constitution?” He neglects the well-documented history of the painstaking efforts that went into writing this globally admired document. Its ingenuity does not stop with the Bill of Rights; it extends to the less-explored sections dealing with executive powers, which are read all too briefly and dismissively – a tendency encouraged by South African political scientists and constitutional lawyers for whom executive power is a bogeyman; the harbinger of tyranny. Manuel also neglects his own party’s history – the ANC long contemplated and debated what kind of constitution the country should have after liberation. Two recent bestsellers – Odendaal’s Dear Comrade President and Mafora’s Capture in the Court – offer just such an overview.
Both men seem to be in agreement, then, that these powers should be curtailed, with Grootes, in his article, even suggesting that “There are measures citizens can take to try to weaken the powers of the President.” (Although he does not point to any concrete ones). His article plays out scenarios which may lead to such a “weakened” presidency, including the seeming inevitability of coalition governments. Here’s one: “If a president believes they are about to leave office or the party in power is about to be replaced, they might well agree to a reduction of their power.”
Of course, the article assumes that there is a desire for a “weak” president in South Africa. Such an assumption would be based on findings contrary to every bit of evidence regarding the way South Africans engage with the state and the expectations they have towards it when they vote. South Africans principally vote because they want government to make a difference to their socio-economic conditions. That is hard to do when the leader of the country would have their hands tied.
At its core, the Grootes-Manuel argument misunderstands or disregards the democratic process: the voting population elects a parliament, which in turn nominates and elects a president. This is not the ideal system of a directly elected president (which Grootes punts and with which we actually agree). And, yes, South Africans may not directly elect their own leader, but they always know who is the presidential ‘candidate’ of their party of choice – his face is on the ballot paper. Some, though not all, also peruse through their party’s manifestos, and thus have a sense of what it is they are picking. The awkward and untimely transitions (from Mbeki to Zuma, and Zuma to Ramaphosa), which Grootes cites, have taken place towards the end of the presidents’ tenures and are thus are no good justification for as broad-sweeping a change as he suggests. (Grootes must also be aware that the leaders of the US and the UK, which he holds up as models, are not any more directly elected than South Africa’s presidents. Otherwise Hillary Clinton would have won in 2016, not Donald Trump.)
With every major problem facing the country, there is an expectation by the public that government, led by the president, will take measures to remedy it. Grootes acknowledges this, but does not take a system-wide view to realise that a president weakened in making appointments, in turn weakens the population’s ability to hold the president, or their party, to account. The reason we are even contemplating coalitions now is because the population, though it does not directly elect its president and parliamentarians, has seen through the failings of the current dominant party and may well punish them at the polls on the 29th of May. This route — more cumbersome and demanding — is what the Constitution requires.
Curtailing the president’s powers would be the constitutional equivalent of cutting off our collective nose to spite our national face. True, as the article points out, there has been state capture and corruption with a certain former president and/or his appointees being the prime suspects. However, the delegation of the process of appointment to an imaginary unaccountable, nameless and faceless blob carries its own risks, which may be far worse than those brought by the present. We can think of two, but even they should suffice. Firstly, the process of delegated appointments of key figures is likely to result in its own temptations for shady backroom dealing no matter who does it. And the point which the article seems to neglect is this: who will appoint the appointers? It would likely still ultimately point to the president, or someone who ultimately answers to the president. Would he/she then not influence the process? Secondly, the appointments would likely result in a situation where the president would always have the indirectly appointed figures for a scapegoat when his/her administration fails to deliver. What we currently have is as good as it gets. It may carry risks, but the alternatives are far worse.
In these pages, Ndzendze has made the argument for a broader interpretation of Chapter 5 of our Constitution by giving presidents and their deputies their own ministerial portfolios in order to ensure transparency and accountability. Such a scheme, requiring no change to the Constitution, would ensure that the public more directly sees through the head of their national government and makes a determination as to whether they are an effective president or not. It also would not give them any powers that they are not already in possession of. A president already carries more power than a minister. Should we indeed find ourselves in a situation where parties that have not been in power at a national level find themselves with the presidency, can have a new president would take a ‘crash course’ in government by being simultaneously president and minister of a chosen portfolio. Elsewhere, it has been has shown that this has led to very good results in other countries.
Imposing additional (and unnecessary) procedural hurdles on the exercise of executive power, which is meant to be the most agile of the three kinds of constitutional powers, would likely worsen governance and not improve it. So, Messers Grootes and Manuel, learn to love all of our Constitution, including the president’s powers.
Ndzendze and Mafora write in their personal capacities.